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91-2045.ZS
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1993-11-06
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
DARBY et al. v. CISNEROS, SECRETARY OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 91-2045. Argued March 22, 1993-Decided June 21, 1993
In a consolidated appeal from decisions by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) to initiate administrative sanctions
against petitioners, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded
that petitioners should be debarred from participating in federal
programs for 18 months. Under HUD regulations, an ALJ's
determination ``shall be final unless . . . the Secretary . . . within 30
days of receipt of a request decides as a matter of discretion to review
the [ALJ's] finding . . . .'' 24 CFR 24.314(c). Neither party sought
further administrative review, but petitioners filed suit in the
District Court, seeking an injunction and declaration that the
sanctions were not in accordance with law within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Respondents moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that petitioners, by forgoing the option
to seek review by the Secretary, had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. The court denied the motion and granted
summary judgment to petitioners on the merits of the case. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court had erred
in denying the motion to dismiss.
Held: Federal courts do not have the authority to require a plaintiff to
exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review under the APA, where neither the relevant statute nor agency
rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial
review. The language of 10(c) of the APA is explicit that an appeal
to ``superior agency authority'' is a prerequisite to judicial review only
when ``expressly required by statute'' or when the agency requires an
appeal ``by rule and provides that the [administrative] action is . . .
inoperative'' pending that review. Since neither the National
Housing Act nor applicable HUD regulations mandate further
administrative appeals, the ALJ's decision was a ``final'' agency action
subject to judicial review under 10(c). The lower courts were not
free to require further exhaustion of administrative remedies,
although the exhaustion doctrine continues to apply as a matter of
judicial discretion in cases not governed by the APA. Nothing in
10(c)'s legislative history supports a contrary reading. Pp. 6-17.
957 F. 2d 145, reversed and remanded.
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with
respect to Parts I, II, and IV, and the opinion of the Court with respect
to Part III, in which White, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ., joined.